Pacific Metals Company Division of A.M. Castle & Company v. Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust Company and Bank of Salt Lake v. Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust Company v. Olympus Heating and Air Conditioning : Brief of Respondent by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1968
Pacific Metals Company Division of A.M. Castle &
Company v. Tracy-Collins Bank and Trust
Company and Bank of Salt Lake v. Tracy-Collins
Bank and Trust Company v. Olympus Heating and
Air Conditioning : Brief of Respondent
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Gary Christiansen, ESQ.; Attorney for Defendant and
Respondent, Bank of Salt Lake
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Pacific Metals v. Tracy-Collins Bank, No. 11083 (1968).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3358
N THE SUPREME, C ·.'\ .. 
. . f, THE STATE .?Qf.)l~·.'. ~ 
' ~ ' > -· ·; 
WOOD le MES!B.VY t,· 
, MESERVY : .· 
... MMys few Cr~A~_.,.· 
. ll, COW AN, FINUNJdJi 
OS DAINES . · ..• 
. ::.Attorneys few A.f>Pellald. · 
.:...~. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF CASE. _____________________________________ --------------------- --------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT._____________________________________________ 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ----------------- __________ --------------------------------·-··············· 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......... . 3 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I-
Bank of Salt Lake is not liable to Pacific Metals be-
cause there has been no acceptance of the check by 
Bank of Salt Lake·-·····-·-····-·--·----·---·········-·-··-·····-··················-··· 5 
POINT II-
Bank of Salt Lake is not liable to Pacific Metals be-
cause of the conduct of Tracy Collins in accepting the 
check with a missing endorsement.. ........... ---·-······--····-··········· 11 
POINT III -
Bank of Salt Lake is not liable to Pacific Metals on 
the theory of third party beneficiary contract·-···------······--· 12 
CONCLUSION _ ----·------------·-------------··-------··------···-----·-·····--···-----···--····-· 21 
TABLE OF CASES CITED 
American National Bank of Denver v. First National Bank 
of Denver, and Hereford State Bank, 277 P.2d 951 (1954) .. 7, 10, 21 
Annis v_ Pfeiffer, 278 Mich. 692, 271 N.W. 568---·····-····--····----····--··· 16 
Associated Flour Haulers & Warehousemen v. 
Hoffman, 282 N. Y. 173, 26 N.E. 2d 7, 10................................ 13 
Bank of Marshall County v. Boyd, 308 Ky. 742, 
215 S.W. 2d 350_ ---·---------·---------·---·····--·---------····-------····-····--·-··-····-10 
Blake v_ Weiden, 291 N. Y. 134, 51 N.E. 2d 677, 
149 A.L.R. 1050 ___ ____ __________ ---···---------------------------------·-------·---- 9 
Bonuso v. Shroyer Loan & Finance Company, Inc., 
D. C. Mun. App. 37 A. 2d 760 .. ----------------···---··-------···---···-·-------· 9 
Brooklawn v. Brooklawn Housing Corp., 124 N. Y. L. 73, 
11 A. 2d 83. ______________________ ---·-··----·--··---------···----··--···--·-·····---·---···-··-· 13 
Columbia Hotel Co. v. Rosenberg, 122 Or. 675, 260 P.235............ 9 
Conrad v. James, 174 Okl. 54, 49 P.2d 718 ... ---------------··--··---··--··--····· 10 
Edgar v. Haines, 109 Ohio St. 159, 141 N.E. 337, 
33 A.L.R. 795 . ---·--·--------------- -----···---·--···------···--··--··-·----···---·------···· 9 
Fink v. Scott. 105 W. Va. 523, 143 S.E. 305. --··--- ---·---·-------------·---··- 10 
Foxman v_ Hanes, 218 N. C. 722, 12 S.E. 2d 258- ....... -----------------··· 10 
Fagliarone v. Consolidated Film Industries, 
20 N. Y. Misc. 193, 26 A. 2d 425, 426 __ . -----··-----------------------·--·· 13 
Hamill v. Maryland Casualty Co. (CA 10 N.M.) 209 F2d 338-... 13 
r 
TABLE OF CONTENTS- (Continued) 
Page 
Hoffman v. First National Bank of Chicago, 
299 Ill. App. 290, N.E. 2d 121.............. ........................... 9 , 
Home Indemnity Co. of New York v. State Bank of 
Fort Dodge, 233 Iowa 103, 8 N.W. 2d 757............................... JO 
Hopple v. Cleveland Discount Co., 25 Ohio App. 138, 
157 N.E. 414 ................................................................................... . 
Karsner v. Cooper, 195 Ky. 8, 241 S.E. 346, 
25 A.L.R. 159 ................................................................................. . 
Kaufman v. State Savings Bank, 151 Mich. 65, 
114 N.W. 863 .................................................................................. 12 
Merchant's National Bank of St. Paul v. State Bank, 
172 Minn. 24, 214 N.W. 750........................................................ 17 
Mills v. Pope, 90 Mont. 569, 4 P. 2d 485 ......................................... . 
Newton County Bank v. Holdeman, 223 Mo. App. 164, 
9 s.w. 2d 852 ·················································································· 
Plattsmith State Bank v. Redding, 128 Neb. 268, 
256 N.W. 661 ................................................................................. . 
Rosecky v. Tomaszewski, 225 Wis. 483, 274 N.W. 259 ............... . 
Rybener v. Feickert, 92 Ill. 305.......................................................... 12 
Schoolfield v. Barnes, 188 Tenn. App. 333, 77 S.W. 2d 66.......... 9 
Slaughter v. First National Bank, 
Tex. Civ. App., 188 S.W. 2d 754................................................ 18 
State Bank of Southern Utah v. Stallings v. Hurricane 
Branch of the Bank of St. George v. Kaze, 19 Utah 
2d 146, 427 P.2d 744 (1967).......................................................... 16 
Utah National Bank of Salt Lake City v. Nelson, 
38 Utah 169, 111 Pac. 907 (1910)................................................ 18 
Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock Land Bank v. First & Citizens 
Nat. Bank of Elizabeth City, 197 N.C. 526, 150 S.E. 34........ 10 
W. D. Anderson & Sons v. Samedan Oil Corp., 
(CA5 Tex.) 210 F2d 600............................................................. .. 13 
Walker Bank and Trust Company v. First Security Corp., 
9 Utah 215, 341 P.2d 944 (1959)................................................. 19 
TEXTS CITED 
38 A.L.R. 807 ........................................................................................ . 
11 Am. Jur. 2d. Bills and Notes, Section 501.. ................................ . 
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, Secs. 302 and 304, pp. 721-730 ......... . 
2 Daniels on Negotiable Instruments (7th Ed.) p. 787, 
Sec. 758, 956 ................................................................................... . 
Title 42, Chapter 2, Section 7, Utah Code Annotated, 1959 ....... . 
Title 44, Chapter 2, Section 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ....... . 
Title 44, Chapter 2, Section 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ....... . 
Title 44, Chapter 3, Section 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ...... . 
12 
15 
13 
JO 
JO 
15 
6, 15 
15 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J'ACIF'IC MErrALS COMPANY, 
Division of A. M. Castle & 
Company, a Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant, 
-VR.-
THACY COLLINS BANK & 
TRUST CO:l\lP ANY, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
arnl 
DANK OF SAT/r LAKE, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
-vs.-
'l1RACY COLLINS BANK & 
THUST COMPANY, 
Cross-Defendant and 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
-\"R.-
OLYMPUS HEATING & AIR 
CONDITIONING, a Corporation, 
Third Party Defendant. 
Case 
No.11083 
BRIEF OF RESP·O·NDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
Tlw case 011 appeal herein involves an action by 
plailltiff, Pacific Metals Company, Division of A. M. Cas-
t]p mid Compan~- (lwrciuafter called Pacific Metals) 
1 
against Tracy Collins Bank and Trnst Company (lwn· 
inafter called Tracy Collins) and Bank of Salt Lake tn 
recover the sum of $5,321.70 representing the fac1• 
amount of a check payable to Olympus Heating and Air 
Conditioning (hereinafter called Olympus) and plain-
tiff. The check was presented to Tracy Collins for pay-
ment by Olympus with the check hearing the endorse-
ment of Olympus only; Tracy Collins paid Olympus the 
face amount of the check, guaranteed all endorscmc•uts, 
and sent the check for collection to the Bank of Salt Lake 
who debited its depositor's account for the amount of 
the check and transferred that amount to Tracy Collins. 
Appare11tly, Pacific :Jfotals did not rccefre a11y of the 
funds from the joint payee check. 
DISPOSI'l'ION IN LOW~JR COUH'l1 
The Third J uclicial District Court, Salt Lake Comity 
(Judge Stewart M. Hanson) granted jndgmcllt i11 favor 
of Pacific Metals and against Tracy Collins but denictl 
plaintiff's motion for r,rnmmary judgment against Bank 
of Salt Lake. From that ruling both Pacific 2\lctals and 
Tracy Collins appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Respondent seeks to have the action of tlic lo\r<'I' 
court affirmed in entering judgment of no cause of ac-
tion in favor of Bank of Salt Lake and against Pacific 
Metals. 
2 
STA'l'K\H~NT OF FACTS 
~[ ay11e Pl um bing and H0a ti Ilg Company (hereinafter 
cnl!r>cl :'.\[ayne Plumbing), a depositor of Bank of Salt 
l,akl', aml not a party to this law suit, had a contract 
for cf>rtain work to he performed on }~ast High School 
in Nalt Lake Cit)'. Olympus, a depositor of Tracy Col-
li11s, was one of l\layne Plumbing's sub-contractors on 
1hat particular jolJ. Olympus was indebted to Pacific 
~[l'!als for materials supplied prior to the East High 
joh aJl(l \\·as apparently getting materials from Pacific 
Jfetals for the East High job. At i10 time referred to 
herein was l\layne Plumbing indebted to Pacific Metals. 
Prior to the issuance of the particular check involved 
in 1!1is litigation, and probably near the time of the in-
cc>ptio11 of work oE the East High job, representatives of 
both Pacific Metals and Olympus requested Mr. Richard 
Bro\\'n of l\fay11e Plumhing to pay all amounts owed by 
~f a)11e Plumbing by checks payable to Olympus Heating 
& .\ir Conditioning and Pacific Metals Company as joint 
priye<'s. At 110 time was :'.\Iayne Plumbing indebted to 
Pacific :'.\Ietals, but Mr. Brown agreed to make the checks 
pa)·alih' in the manner requested as an accommodation 
to Ol)·mpus and Pacific l\Ietals. 
On or about October 18, 1%.J, 1\Iayne Plumbing is-
c;1wcl its cheek drmvn on the Bank of Salt Lake and pay-
nl11P to Olympus Heating & Air Conditioning and Pa-
ci!ic :\ldals Compa11y i11 the amount of $5,321.70 and 
1lt>linn'd it to Olympus. An C'mployee of the latter 
'tamped the chl'ck on the back with a stamp providing 
for the followi11g: 
3 
PAY TO THE ORDER OF 
TRACY-COLLINS BANK AND 'l'HUST 
COMPANY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
FOR DEPOSIT ONLY 
OLMYPUS HEATING & AIR CONDITIONING 
PAYROLL ACCOUNT 
0212 605 0 
The check wa,s then sent to Tracy Collins for dcpo~it to 
the account of Olympus. ·without the e11dorsement o[ 
Pacific :.\fatals, employees of Tracy Collins credited the 
account of Olympus and then sent the check through 
regular banking channels for collectio11 from the Bank of 
Salt Lake with their stamp rn·o,,iding the following-: 
31-Gl PAY ANY BANK 31-61 
P. E.G. 
TRACY-COLLINS 
BANK AND TRUST CO. 
31-Gl SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH :H-61 
Upon receipt of the check by th0 Bank of Salt Lake, 
and relying on the Prior Endorsements Guaranteed 
stamp by Tracy Collins, it transfcn('(l funds in the fare 
amount of the cheek from the accom1t of :\£ayne Plumb-
ing to the collec.1ing bank, Tracy Collins. 
Plaintiff Pacific -l\letals, not having recein1 cl any of 
the funds from the particular check, brought this aetioli 
against both Tracy Collins and Bank of Salt Lake to 
recover the face amount of the check. 
One other element that respornlent feels is of Aig-
nificance in this matter is the proportionate share that 
4 
f'aritir l\f etals and Olympus would each receive from the 
joi11t payce che<'ks. It seems clear that after the issuance 
,,f each d1eck hy Mayne Plumbing that Kenneth L. Wil-
liams representing Paf'ific Metals and Clark Stott rep-
n•sp11ti11g Olympus would negotiate for the division of 
turn].,.;. 1 u each case each party would a ttcmpt to get as 
large a share as possible, but in no case was the amount 
1liat each would receive set, nor in any two cases was the 
same amount received by either of the parties. See 
(Drposition of Kenneth L. Williams pp. 7-8, 16-17; Depo-
,;itioll of Clark Stott pp. 24-27, 29-30, 37). 
The contention of Bank of Salt Lake that it is not 
liable to plaintiff in this matter is based upon Points I, 
II, and III which ·will be set forth under the points in-
tliratrd and with authorities to be discussed under each 
poi11 t. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BAKK OF SALT LAKE IS NOT LIABLE TO 
PACIFIC I\IETALS BFJCAUSE THERE HAS 
BEEN NO ACCEPTANCE OF rrHE CHECK 
B "i_' BANK OF SALT LAKE. 
111 this case it should be pointed out again, for the 
sake of elari(\', that Mayne Plumbing was the maker of 
thr check in question; Olympus and Pacific :Metals were 
.iirnt payees of said check; Bank of Salt Lake was the 
liank 011 which the check was drawn; and Tracy-Collins 
Bank aud Trnst Company was the collection bank and 
1111• 0110 to whom the check was presented for payment. 
5 
Under the Uniform Negotiable Jnstrumcnts Law, 
which law was in force and cffed in Utah at the tim~ 
of the transactions, accepta11ce of a bill of exchange is 
necessary to render a drawee liable thereon, and th1" 
drawee is not liable thereon until he accepts it. 11 Arn. 
.Jm. 2d, Bi11s a1nd Notes, Section 301. 
Title 44, Chapter 2, Sectiou 2, Utah Code ~\nno­
tated, 1933, which is the same as Section 127 ll niform 
Negotiable Instruments Law, provides as follows: 
A bill of itsdf docs not operate as an assig11IDr·11t 
of the funds in the hands of the drawee availahlt, 
for the payment thereof, ancl the dra·11:ee i.s 1101 
liable on the bill unless and until he accepts t/Jr 
same. (1'Jmphasis added) 
However, as between the drawer and the drawee., the 
latter may he under an obligation to accrpt a liill of ('X-
change drawn hy the former, but that prohll'm is not 
hefore the court in this eontrovl'rsy. 
It is the position of Bank of Salt Lake that it clid 
not, has not, and camwt have acceptrd the eheck in qnC'~­
tion because the cheek was not a negotiahle instrum('11!, 
and therefore no liahility could luwe arisen to Pacific 
Metals on the check. Acceptauce, the basis of lia hilit.r : 
of a drawee under the N.I.L., is a procedure pecnliar to 
negotiable instruments and has no applicatio11 to non-
negotiable instruments. 
Bank of Salt Lake contends that when Tracy-Col-
lins accepted the check of l\Iayne Plumbing with the en-
dorsemC'nt of one of the joint payees the instrummit 
failed of negotiability or lost its negotiable character antl 
(j 
J1peame au assignme11t as between Tracy-Collins and 
Trns1 Compa11y mid Bank of Salt Lake. 
American National Banh of Deucer v. First Nalional 
/!1111/.. of Den1'er, and Hereford State Bank, 277 P.2d 951 
( l!J:i+) is iu point. 'l'he facts of the case are as follows: 
Jf 11go Sells :\Iotors, a depositor in plaintiff's bank, on 
\Tovember 21, 1952, issued its check in the sum of $5,050 
payable to the order of Frontier I\Iotor Company and 
Orneral Credit, Cheyenne, Wyoming. On the face of 
the rheck appeared the following: "By endorsement this 
rheck is accepted in full payment of the following ac-
l'Ount'' listing 'two 1952 automobiles with the motor num-
hC'r::; thereof. There also appeared on the face of the 
chl'l'k, "Know Your Endorser - Require Identification." 
'l'he clwck, when it was presented to defendant Hereford, 
horc• the following endorsement only, "Pay to the order 
uf The Hereford State Bank, Hereford, Colorado, For 
DC'posi t Only, Frontier Motor Co." 
Hereford State Bank, on the endorsement of Fron-
tier Motor Compa11y, credited it with $5,050, and then 
P11dorse1l the check ''Pay to the Order of Any Bank, 
Bm1ke>r or Trust Co. Prior Endorsement Guaranteed 
lfordord Staite Bank 82-418 Hereford, Colo. 82-418," 
alld the check as thus endorsed was sent through bank-
i11.!2: rhnm1els to The American National Bank of Chey-
l'1111e, w·~,oming (which was not a party to the action) and 
11~· it sent to clefrndant The First National Bank, each 
tlicn•after luwing enclorsecl the check, "Pay to the Order 
of Any Bank, Bnnker or Trust Co. Prior Endorsements 
tl11ar:rntet•t1." Defernlant, First Natio1rnl Bank then pre-
sruted the check to plaintiff through the Denyer Clearin" 
' 
House; it was paid, and charged by plaintiff to Hu!(u 
Sells Motors deposit. Hugo Sells .l\Iotors, the maker and 
tlrawer of the check, objected to the payment thereof 
liecause "General Credit endorsement was not thereon" , 
and General Credit having refused to endorse the che{'k, 
plaintiff reimbursed Hugo Sells .l\fotors in the amount 
of $5,050 by paying said amount to General Credit. 
Plaintiff thereafter brought au action against the 
two defendants for the amount paid by it to General 
Credit. 
The court held that where Hngo Sells Motors, de-
positor in American N aitional Bank, plaintiff bank, issue(l 
its check payable to the order of an automobile dealer 
and a credit company, and when the check was presented 
to Hereford State Bank, it bore the endorsement of only 
one payee, the automobile dealer, and defendant Hereford 
State Bank eredi,ted the account of the automobile dealer 
with the amount of the check, guaranteed prior eudorsr-
ments, and sent the check through banking channels to 
defendant, First National Bank of Denver, who endorsed 
the check, guaranteed prior endorsements, and presented 
the check to plaintiff bank, who paid the check but therP-
after reimbursed its depositor because the check was 
not properly endorsed, plaintiff, American N rutional 
Bank of Denver could recover the amount of the cheek 
from Hereford State Bank but not First National Bank 
of Denver. 
In so holding the court made the following state-
ments: 
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Under the common lmY, as well as by our Nego-
Jiable Instruments Law where one of the payees 
fails to endorse, the negotiability of the check is 
completely destroyed. Mills v. Poper, 90 Mont. 
569, 4 P.2c1 485; Rosecky v. Tomaszewski, 225 Wis. 
483, 274 N.W. 239; Bonuso v. Shroyer Lo0r1i & Fi-
11a11ce Compwny, Inc., D.C. l\Iun. App. 37 A.2d 
760; Newton County Bank v. HoidemO!rt, 223 Mo. 
App. 164, 9 S.W. 2d 852. The holder of the check, 
after this failure to endorse, acquires the inter-
Pst of an assignee only, and as such his interest in 
the proceeds of the check are to be determined. 
p. 956. 
The court further stated that: 
We conclude that when defendant Hereford, being 
charged v•ith the absolute duty of determining 
tha1t the payees on the check endorsed the same if 
it was to become a holder in due course, neglecited 
to do so, and accepted the check with the endorse-
ment of Frontier Motor Co. only thereon, it 
acquired only such interest in the check as Fron-
tier Motor had therein. Hereford acquired an 
assigument of Frontier's interest in the check 
and could not, without the endorsement of the co-
payee, transfer title thereto as a negotiable in-
strument. At best Hereford acquired an interest 
in a non-negotiable chose in action. Blake v. Wei-
den, 291N.Y.134, 51N.E.2d 677, 149 A.L.R.1050; 
Hopple v. Cleveland Discount Co., 25 Ohio App. 
BS, 157 N.E. 414; Hoff man v. First Na.tional Bank 
of Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 290, 20 N.E.2d 121; Platt-
smith State Bank v. Redding, 128 Neb. 268, 256 
N.W. 661; Schoolfield v. Barnes, 18 Tenn. App. 
333, 77 S.W.2cl 66; Bon11so v. Shroyer Loan & Fi-
nance Co., Inc., supra; K arsner v. Cooper, 195 Ky. 
8, 241 S.W. 346, 25 A.L.R. 159; Edgar v. Haines, 
109 Ohio St. 159, 141 N.E. 337, 33 A.L.R. 795; Co-
l 11111 bia Hotel Co., .. Rosenberg, 122 Or. 675, 260 P. 
~) 
235; Conrad v. James, 174 Okl. 54, 49 P.2<l 718: 
Bank of Marshall Co111ity Y. Boyd, 308 Ky. 742, 
215 s:w. 2cl 350; Home fodcmnity Co. of Ncn' 
York v. State Bank of Fort Dodge, 233 Iowa lO:J, 
8 N.W. 2d 757; Foxman v. Hanes, 218 N.C. 722, 
12 S.E. 2d 258; Fink v. Scott, 105 W. Va. 52:1, 14:l 
S.E. 305; Virginia-Carolina Joint Stock I1ai1rl 
Bank v. First & Citizens Nat. Bank of E1izal!rtl1 
City, 197 N.C. 52G, 150 S.E. 34; 2 Daniels on l\e-
gotiahle Instruments (7th Ed.) p. 787, Sec. 7~R, 
p. 956. 
vV e conclude that neither Hereford nor othL·r rn-
dorsers on the check here in question became 
holders in due course; and that hy reason of thr i, 
absence of the endorsement of General Credit, 
Cheyenne, \Vyo., the check became a non-rn:gotin-
ble chose in aetion. p. 956. 
In line with American National Bank of De11rer 
v. First National Bank of Denver and Here ford State 
Bank, op. cit., and the cases cited therein, Bank of Salt 
Lake contends that by reason of the acceptance by Trncy-
Gollins of the check involved in this action ·without tlw 
endorsement of Pacific Metals caused the cheek to fail 
in its negotiability. Thereafter instead of being a nP-
gotiable instrument the check became a non-negotiable 
chose in action. Acceptance is a procedure that is pe-
culiar to negotiable instruments and has no application 
and cannot have any application to non-negotiahlP items. 
Title 42, Chapter 2, Article 7, Utah Code Annotateil. 
1953, provides as follows: 
The acceptance of a bill is the sig11ification by ilH' 
drawee of his assent to the order of the drawer. 
The acceptance must be in writing and signed h,1· 
10 
the drawee. It must not express that the dra·wee 
will perform his promise hy any other means than 
the payment of money. 
It has already been pointed out tha,t 44-2-2 U.C.A., 1953 
provides that "the drawee is not lia h1e 011 the bi11 unless 
an(1 mttil he accepts same." 
Ina,;much as Bank of Salt Lake is the drawee on the 
('heck involved iu this action it cannot be liable to any 
of the payees of said check unless and until it accepted 
!he check. Since acceptance is a procedure that has 
mrauing and application to nego 1tiable instruments only, 
and since the check in question herein is not a negotiable 
inshument but a non-negotiable chose in action Bank of 
Salt Lake did not ancl could not have accepted it as a ne-
g·otiah1e instrument, and hence could not be and is not 
liable to plaintiff, Pacific l\Ietals Company, one of the 
payees on flw check. Defendant, Bank of Salt Lake, urges 
this contention and earnestly claims that the contention 
it> m<·ritorious and is correcrt. 
POINT II 
BA;\K OF SALT LAKE IS NOT LIABLE TO 
PACIFIC METALS BECAUSE OF THE CON-
DUCT OF TRACY COLLINS IN ACCEPTING 
THE CHECK \VITH A MISSING ENDORSE-
~rENT. 
The obligatiou, if any, exists by either of the two de-
fenda11ts to this ac,tion, to pay plaintiff the face amount 
()f the eheck is the obligation of Tracy-Collins and not the 
Bm1k of Salt Lake. This assertion is hasecl upon the 
g"P1iernl rule of law to the effect that one who takes a 
11 
transfer of the ownership of an insfrumeut from lPRs 
than all of the joint payees and collects the instrument 
or money thereon, is liable to the other payee or payees 
for their proportionate share. In this regard see Ry-
be,11er Y. Feickert, 92 Ill. 303; Kaufman v. State 8aril!,1is 
Bank, 151 Mich. 63, 114 N.vV. 863. Sec also the mrnota-
tion at 38 A. L. R . 807. 
The evidence is without conflict that Tracy-Collin,q 
accepted the joint pay<:>e check from only one of the pay-
ees with one payee's endorsement missing; it cr0diterl 
the account of the one payee with the full amount of the 
check and then sent the check through regular hauking-
channels for collection from Bank of Salt Lake, the 
drawee bank. Tracy-Collins was paid the full amount 
of the check by the Bank of Salt Lake and thereforr col-
lected the full amount of the check. Based upon the facts 
and the law it is then the obligation of Tracy Collins to 
pay Pacific l\Ietals its proportionate share of the check 
and not the obligation of Bank of Salt Lake> to do so. 
POINT III 
BANK OF SALT LAKE IS NOT LIABLE TO 
PACIFIC :METALS ON THE THEORY OF 
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CON'l'RACT. 
A third partr beneficiary contract is an agrremc11t 
entered into behYeen two parties, "-ith all the necessary 
elements for the validity of a simple contra<'rt prpsrnt, 
which contract or the result tlwreof is designed for the 
benefit of a third party who is 11ot a party to thr co11trnrt. 
12 
~\s a general proposiition, the tletermining factor as 
to the rights of a third party beneficiary is the intention 
of the parties who actually made the contract. The 
real test seems to he whether the contracting parties in-
tl'micd that a third person should receive a benefit which 
might ])c enforced in the courts. lV. D. Anderson & Sons 
1. 8amcdan Oil Corp., (CA5 Tex.) 210 F2d 600; Hamill 
v. Maryland Casualty Co. (CA 10 NJ\L) 209 F2d 338; 
Hrooklawn v. Brooklaivn Housing Corp., 124 N.J.L. 73, 
11 A.2d 83. 
In order for one not privy to a contract to maintain 
nn action thereon as a "third-party beneficiary,'' it must 
appear that the contract \\'as made and intended for his 
henefit. Fagliaro11e v. Consolida.ted Film Industries, 
20 X.J. j!isc. 103, 26 ),~.2d 425, 426; and the benefit must 
lie' one that is not merely incidental, but must be imme-
cliate in such a sense and degree as to indicate the as-
sumption of a duty to make reparation if the benefit is 
lost. ,1 ssociat ed Flour Haulers & TV areh ousemen v. 
llofj'ma11, 282 N. Y. 173, 26 ~.E. 2d 7, 10. See also 17 Am . 
. Jnr. 2cl, Contracts, Secs. 302 & 304, pp. 721-730, and the 
casPs there citecl. 
Bnnk of Salt Lnke contends that neither the check 
on~r which this adion arose nor the placing of Pacific 
~I eta ls on the check im·olved ereated a third party bene-
ticin ry contract in favor of Pacific l\Ietals. 
It is undi::;putecl tlia:t Olympus was a sub-contractor 
oj' ~lay11e Plumbing on what has been called the East 
High Sehool job :mcl that although jfayne Plumbing be-
came iuclebted to Olympus from time to time at no time 
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was it enr indebted to Pacific l\letals. Apparently 01.vm-
pus was incle btecl to Pacific l\1 etals and ha cl been for 
some time. On the occasion when the request was made 
of l\Iayne Plumbing to issue all checks payable to hotJ1 
Pacific ::\Ietals and Olympus Heating, l\Iayne Plnmbin;; 
clicl not have au account with Pacific Metals a11c1 tltr· 
transaction was not tied to any account in any way. Tt 
was merely an accommodation by l\Iayne Plumbing t11 
both Pacific Metals and Olympus because they requested 
it. l\fr. Williams of Pacific Metals indicated that ther 
"were asking him to do this out of the gooduess of his 
heart so to spe·ak'' and not because he was obliga.ted to 
do so nor to create any obligation on the part of Mayiw 
Plumbing. (Deposition of Kenneth L. Williams p. 31.) 
The record is clear that the request to Mayne was 
not couched in terms of a contract between the 1rnrfas, 
it was not intended to be a contract and certainly tl1crc 
was no intention between Olympus and l\Iayrn' Plumb-
ing that the transaction would give Pacific l\Ietals all.I' 
right that could be enforced in a comt of law. If Pacific 
Metals acquired any rights it would have been on the 
check not on the arrangement to include both names on 
the check. 
Respondent also contends that e\-e11 if the arrange-
ment could be construed as a coutract it faih; i11 its Ya-
lidity as such because of lack of consideration extendNl 
hy the other parti('S or either of them to Mayne. 
Inasmuch as the trausaction, upon this aetion i,; 
brought, occurred in about October, 1965, the N egotiahlc 
Iustnuneuts Law is applicable rather than the Comnwr-
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cial Code. The pertinent provisions of the N.I.L. as in-
corporated into the Utah Code provide as follows: 
44-2-1. "Bill of exchange" defined. - A bill of 
exchange is an unconditional order in writing, ad-
dressed by one person to another, signed by the 
pen;on giving it, requiring the person to whom it 
is addressed to pay on demand, or at a fixed or 
determinable future time, a sum certain in money 
to order or to bearer. 
44<~-2. ''Check'' defined. - A check is a bill of 
exchange drawn on a bank, payable on demand. 
Except as herein otherwise provided, the provi-
sions of this title applicable to a bill of exchange 
payable on demand apply to a check. 
H-2-2. Bill not an assignment of funds in hands 
of drawee. - A bill of itself does not operate as 
an assignment of the funds in tlrn hands of the 
drawee available for the payment thereof, and the 
clnw,,ee is not liahle on the bill unless and until he 
accepts the same. 
Bills and notes in their various forms are contracts 
awl the fundamental rules governing contract law are 
HlJIJlicablc to the determination of the legal questions 
which arise over such iushnmenh;. However, bills and 
notes are capable of being cast in such form as to have 
the quality of negotiability. Instruments having this 
lJUality of negotiability, while their nature as contracts 
i11 unimpaired are distinguished from ordinary contracts. 
11 Am .. Jnr. 2c1, Bills m1cl Notes, Section 301. A bill of ex-
dian,ge or cheek of itself is not an assignment or a third 
tmrty beneficiary co11trnd. A check is a simple contract 
until it takes on peculiar foatnre·s through negotiation by 
tlw payee 01· as may expressly he declared by statute. 
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Annis v. Pfeiff'er, 278 Mich. G92, 271 N.vV. 5G8. A eheek is 
an order gfren hy a credit ( tlw depositor), to his debtor 
(the bank) to pay part or all of the clt'ht (the deposit) to 
some designated person. It is a conversation, if yon will, 
betwPen a creditor and his debtor. 
The bank takes its orders from the depositor. As far 
as it is concerned, the debt is clue to him until it receiYe~ 
an order to the contrary in the form of a check and makes 
final payment along those lines. The payee is ont of the 
picture until he actually gets his hands on the money 
since the bank has undertaken no lia hili ty to him. This 
is why a bank feels no misgivings about honoring a stop 
order even though this may seriously inconvenit'nce the 
payee. :F'urther, the only recourse the payee haR is 
against the dra"·er on the debt; there is no liability on 
the part of the drawee bank to the payee until adual 
acceptance (which cannot occur on the instrument which 
has lost its negotiability). 
Thus the disappointed payee is left to get his mouey 
from the depositor, not the bank. State Bank of So1dher11 
Ftah v. Stallings, v. H11rric011c Branch of the Bank of St. 
C:eorge v. Kaze, 19 Utah 2d 146, 427 P.2d 7-!4 (1967). 
In that case [lppellants as general contractors eon-
structell a public 8chool building. Defendant, Stalling~, 
was the electrical sub-contractor and bought his merchan-
dise from vYestinghouse Supply Company. Stallings 
owed "'estinghonse approximately $8,000 of whieh $2,'.:!00 
was past due. 
Appellants maclc out a eheek to Stallings in the 
amount of $2,2;)0 and requeRted him to endorse it so 
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;1ppellants could take it to -Westinghouse and apply it on 
the <lelinquent account. Stallings claimed that 'Vest-
inghonse hacl requested only $2,200 and refused to en-
dorse the check, whereupon appellants gave the check to 
StalliHgs to he deposited in his checking account in Hur-
l'icaw; Brm1eh of the Bank of St. George; Stallings then 
.~m-c his own check made payable to 'Vestinghouse in the 
amount of $2,200 to the appellants to deliver to West-
inglwnse. 
Respondent, State Bank of Southern Utah, had a 
l'Onplr of judgmcllts against Stallings, and before the 
W cstinghouse check could pass through the clearing 
house, respondent had placed two garnishments against 
Ntallings' account in the Hurricane Branch Bank. Appel-
lants intervened in the two cases from which the garnish-
ments were issued and now claim that the check from 
Stallings was an assignment of $2,200 of the bank ac-
rom1t when and if the $2,230 check from appellants 
was deposited. 
Ju disposing of this case the court said at 19 Utah 
3ll 147: 
"·we do not think that the giving of the check 
operated as an assignment in this case .... '' 
.\ncl at page 148: 
"In this case there can be no question hut that 
Stallings had the power to stop payment on the 
check. 
''Of course, the assignor and the assignee may by 
agreement make an assignment by means of a 
check. See Merchant's National Bank of St. Paul 
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Y. State Hank, 172 l\fom. 24 ,214 N".\r. 730, Sla11gli-
trr v. First National Bank, Tex. Civ. App., 18 
S.\V. 2d 7fl4. Howc,-er, no such agreement was 
f'\'er made by the parties to tlw alleged assign-
ment. Stallings and ·westinghonse nenr spokr 
to C>ach other abont the ch0ck. Tlw appe>llanh 
pla11n0d th0 tnmsacitio11s hnt clid not fores00 t]1p 
consequences. Had they wished an assig11me>11t, 
they could have taken th0 Stallings' ehecfr to thr 
hank and had it certified.'' 
The same ma~' lw said in the instant ease>. Evr11 
though l\Iayne Plumbing had issnecl its eheck payable to 
Pacific ::\Ietals and Olympus joi11tl~- it could lrnYe stopped 
payment on it before the check was pn•scnted for pay-
ment. It also seems apparent that even though the par-
ties could have entered into a third party beneficiary eoll-
fract for the be11efit of Pacific Mefa1s no snch agreement 
was made, and that Pacific ::\Ietals and Olympns, "·itl10ut 
Mayne Plumbing hei11g involved in the planning, plmmed 
the transactions but did not foresee the consequcnees. 
Respondent has been unable to fol(l a11r cases sqw11T-
ly in point to assist the court in rpsoh'ing the question 
presented herein. Furthermore, r0spo11dent takes the 
position that none of the cases eited b~' Pacifie l\fota1s iu 
Point IV of its brief arc in point. 
Bank of Salt Lak0 has no quanel with Utah Na-
tioual Bank of Salt Lake City v. Nelsou, :38 Ftal1 1G9, 
111 Pac. 907 (1910) as cited h3' cross-appellant. That 
ease im·olv0s a promissory note 1t0t a cl1eck. It iR trnr 
tliat a eo11tract for thP be1wfit of a third party giws 
rights to the third part)· upon which he may sul' to pro-
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!l'd his interests; however, the instant action is not such 
a c·ase. 
'l'lw case of lValker Bm1k awl Trust Company v. 
First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d 215, 341 P.2d 944 (1959) 
i~ not in point. There, the Commercial Bank of Utah, 
First Security Corp. predecessor, failed to pay premi-
nms 011 au iusnrauce policy upon the life of Nancy Gal-
lagher in accorclmwe with an authorization furnished it 
ii)· ]H·l'. 
Nancy Gallagher, the insured, took out a policy with 
American Investors Life Insurance Company of Dallas, 
'l'exas, on August 9, 1955. She signed a "Sight Draft Au-
thorization,'' which requested and authorized the Com-
merC'ial Bank at Spanish Fork, Utah, to charge her 
ac·<·om1t with drafts to be drawn by the insurance com-
1ia11y for the monthly premiums on the policy. The 
hank aC'cepted the authorization and paid drafts for the 
1uuuths of September, 1955, through :March, 1956. Some-
time after the March payment the bank mislaid the a.u-
t110rization, which resulted in the drafts for April and 
.\lay, 1956, being returned to the insurance company with 
t lw not a ti on "Kot authorized." The bank did not notify 
the insured of the dishonored clrafts and no further pre-
miums were paid. The policy became lapsed and was so 
when the insured died on August 12, 1956. The insurance 
c·c1mpany refused to pay the policy proceeds to the bene-
Jic·inrics. 'l'he action \vas brought on the ground that 
thP 1wglige11ce of the bank in failing to honor the April 
iltH1 .\1 ay drafts result eel in the lapse of the policy and 
loss of the proceeds to the children. 
19 
In deciding the case the court said at 9 Utah 2d 218: 
"U mlcr the circumstances he· re shown it was eri-
llcnt to the bank that the monthly drafts covered 
insurance premiums and that failure to pay thern 
would result in lapse of the policy and lo8s of pro-
tection thereunder. Having accepted the respon-
sibility, the duty to fulfill it ran both to the depos-
itor and to her beneficiaries for whom she mai11-
tained the policy, and the bank was obliged to 
exercise due care in performing that duty at least 
until it notified the insured to the contrary.'' 
In the vY alker Bank case l\lrs. Gallagher was the de-
positor of defendant bank. She had a direct agreement 
with the bank to honor sight drafts in order to keep her 
in8urance policy in force and effect for the benefit of 
her children. These facts are a far cry from the case on 
appeal herein. In the instant case Mayne Plumbing did 
not enter into an agreement with the Bank of Salt Lake 
for the benefit of Pacific Metals. It merely named Pa-
cific Metals as one of the payees on a check representing 
money owed to Olympus, and did so as an accommoda-
tion to the latter, even though Bank of Salt Lake was 
not indebted to Pacific Meitals. That a third party bene-
ficiary contract for the benefit of the Gallagher children 
was involved in the Walker Bank case seems apparent. 
By no stretch of the law or the facts can a third-party 
beneficiary contract for the benefit of Pacific Metals be 
made to appear. 
Cross-appellant, Pacific Metals, makes much in its 
brief about the Bank of Salt Lake's clut~- to l\fay11e 
Plumbing, its depositor. It should be pointed out here 
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tl1at Paeific }detals has not taken any legal aetion agairu;t 
~[ayrn Plumbing to recover the amount of the check in 
t1ncstio11, and rightly so because it has no cause of ac-
tion agai11st l\Iayne. It slwuld also be pointed out that 
.\f aync Plumbing has commenced no action against the 
B;rnk of SaH Lake for any violation of its duties to Mayne 
Plumbing. Therefore, it seems to respondent that any 
:ind all questions about the duties of Bank of Salt Lake 
to ifa depositor, Mayne Plumbing, are moot. 
The last case cited by cross-appellant under Point 
IV of its brief is Anierican National Bank of Denver v. 
First National Bank of Den1;er, supra, also discussed 
at length under Point I of this brief. That case is not in 
poiut in discussing third-party ooneficiary contracts, be-
muse no such question is presented therein either under 
the law or the facts. There, the drawee bank brought 
an action against the bank to whom the check was first 
presented for payment, after first having reimbursed 
its depositor for having debited its accom1t for the face 
amount of the cheek. Again, respondent has no quarrel 
with the propositions cited in that case, but contends 
that neither the case nor the propositions quoted from it 
are applicable to the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
Jn view of the facts, authorities and argument pre-
:;ented herein, respondent, Bank of Salt Lake, concludes 
and therefore asserts that it is not liable to cross-appel-
21 
lant, Pacific Metals, on any theory presented hy the latter 
in its brief. Respondent respectfully prays the court that 
the judgment of the lower court, as it applies to the Bank 
of Salt Lake, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
D. GARY CHRIS'l'IAN, ESQ. 
Attorney for Def end ant 
and Respondent, 
Bank of Salt Lake 
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